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Independent Monitor's Assessment Report

Jordan Compact and Brussels meetings

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Foreword

This report presents the third Independent Monitor's Assessment being undertaken by Agulhas Applied Knowledge of the commitments made by the Government of Jordan and the International Community under the Jordan Compact and at subsequent Brussels meetings in 2017, 2018 and 2019. This is a report on progress to date against the indicators in the Monitoring and Assessment Framework, supplemented by qualitative assessments by the Independent Monitor. It covers data for the full year 2019 with a narrative update to March 2020. It is a backward-looking assessment and, as such, does not reflect the new situation created by the COVID-19 crisis, which will need to be addressed in future monitoring reports.

The report assesses performance against commitments made and also against the outcomes that these commitments were intended to produce. No new beneficiary consultations were undertaken for this report. Where data sources are not quoted, data is drawn from the Framework and the sources of data are referenced in that document.

The report follows the same structure as the Monitoring and Assessment Framework:

- **Economic**
 - Livelihoods
 - Trade and investment

- **Social**
 - Education
 - Health
 - Social Protection

- **Protection**

- **Partnership**
 - Financial support (humanitarian, budget and programme)
 - Aid quality and effectiveness

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1. Introduction

The Jordan Compact was adopted at the “Supporting Syria and the region” conference in London in February 2016, and was strengthened and expanded at the “Supporting the future of Syria and the region” conferences held in Brussels and hosted by the European Union (EU) in April 2017, April 2018 and March 2019. It was a new, holistic approach agreed between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community (IC) to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis. The 2015 census estimated that there were 1.265 million Syrians resident in Jordan, of whom 953,289 self-identified as refugees. There were 654,692 Syrians registered as refugees with UNHCR as at 5 January 2020 (50.1% women and 49.9% men) down by 16,859, or 2.5%, since January 2019.¹ Hosting the Syrian refugees has placed severe stress on Jordan’s economy, public services and fiscal position. The Compact acknowledges both the humanitarian and development needs of the refugees and the heavy burden for Jordan of hosting them. This is recognised as a global public good provided by Jordan on behalf of the international community as a whole.

There have been over one hundred commitments made by Government of Jordan (GoJ) and IC at the four conferences. They include quantitative targets, process-based commitments and mutual undertakings, requiring action by both GoJ and IC. For this report, the assessment framework is based on 2019 data on the commitments made by GoJ and IC at the three conferences in 2016-2018. The 2019 meeting produced a final declaration, which reinforced the commitments made at previous meetings. Specifically, the co-chairs and main donors agreed to “widen the resource base and ensure greater predictability, coherence and effectiveness of the aid”. This Independent Monitor’s report reviews progress during 2019 on delivering the commitments made at these conferences, the difference that the activities of GoJ and IC have made for Syrian refugees and Jordanian communities and the challenges that have been encountered.

Nine years into the Syria crisis, more than 5.5 million Syrians have sought refuge in Jordan and other neighbouring countries.² Many face growing vulnerability, as their savings, assets and resources are exhausted. Of 654,692 UNHCR registered refugees in Jordan, about 19% are living in camps,³ while the remainder have settled in urban and rural areas, living among host communities, primarily in northern governorates and in Amman. The Syria crisis occurred in a context where Jordan’s economy, labour market and provision of social services were already under strain following the 2008 financial crisis and regional conflicts. The Syria crisis has placed further strain on the country’s economy and infrastructure, putting pressure on all sectors including education, health, housing, water, municipal services and electricity supply. It exacerbated underlying challenges in Jordan including the quality of education,

¹ UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Operations Portal, [link](#)

² UNHCR Operational Portal, as at 14 February 2020, [link](#)

³ UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Operations Portal, [link](#)

unemployment, the business environment and the role of women in society. Jordanians and Syrians living in host communities see the impact of the crisis on their daily lives, due to increasing pressures on local services, natural resources and the labour market.

These pressures will be further exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, which hit Jordan in early March 2020. It is already clear that this will have severe impacts on livelihoods, export earnings, government finances, health, education and every other aspect of life for Jordan as a nation and for the Syrian refugees, especially those living outside the camps. Although this report monitors achievements in 2019, we acknowledge that Jordan is now entering an uncertain and challenging period in which partnership with IC will be of critical performance and many priorities will have to be reassessed in order to address the COVID-19 pandemic.

This report should be read in conjunction with the Monitoring and Assessment Framework. Any figures for which sources are not given can be found in the Framework.

2. The independent monitoring process

At the Brussels II Conference in April 2018, GoJ and IC agreed to 'identify the best modality to assess progress against mutual commitments made in London and Brussels'. This reflects a commitment in the Jordan Compact for 'co-hosts and others to work with the GoJ to put in place... a mechanism for implementing, communicating and monitoring the commitments on both sides'.

The Humanitarian Development Partner Group (HDPG), represented by a Project Co-ordination Team consisting of the GoJ, the EU, the United Nations (UN) and the Jordan INGO Forum (JIF), identified the need for a Monitoring and Assessment Framework to be developed with an assessment of progress to date against priority commitments and a process for tracking progress in the future. The EU commissioned Agulhas Applied Knowledge to undertake an initial phase of work in January to March 2019 to review the monitoring data being generated, work with stakeholders to develop a Monitoring and Assessment Framework, prepare an independent monitoring report on progress, and then to act as an Independent Monitor on an ongoing basis. The Monitoring and Assessment Framework and the monitoring report were then updated in September 2019.

The present report summarises the outcome of the third phase of this work in March and April 2020 and captures new data generated during calendar year 2019 and developments since March 2019. Alongside the Monitoring and Assessment Framework, this report is intended to serve as one of the tools for continued policy dialogue between the GoJ and its international partners. The report consists of an overall assessment, more detailed assessments within each of the sectors and a proposed way forward. Under each heading we aim to summarise the key commitments and then to focus on new data and developments.

3. Overall assessment

The Jordan Compact and subsequent Brussels meetings have created a unique international framework for co-operation between the GoJ and IC. This innovative and effective approach has helped to enable Jordan to host Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR, who at the end of 2019 numbered 654,692⁴, in peace and security with access to basic services and economic opportunities. The Jordan Response Plan (JRP) has provided a framework for support to Syrian refugees and host communities. During 2019 the GoJ collaborated with UN agencies, donors, and civil society organisations to produce the new JRP 2020-2022, with the draft being finalised during February 2020. This is based on seven sectors and is linked to national plans and strategies, the Sustainable Development Goals and the Global Compact on Refugees.

The JRP offers a platform for partners to provide services for vulnerable Jordanians impacted by Syria crisis and Syrian refugees in Jordan. The JRP includes a chapter that evaluates the impact of the Syria crisis on Jordan, including the increased costs of services such as water and sanitation, labour, education and other public services, which since 2011/2012 has averaged \$1.5 billion annually.⁵

Jordan continues to face a range of economic challenges. Overall unemployment in the fourth quarter of 2019 was 19.0%, with youth unemployment (age 15 to 24) at 44%.⁶ The situation is particularly acute for women, of whom only 13.5% are economically active.⁷ Public debt constituted 96.6% of GDP at the end of 2019, compared with 60% in 2008. Average economic growth in recent years has been 2% per year leading to a fall in per capita incomes. In January 2020 Jordan agreed a \$1.3 billion IMF facility with a first instalment of \$140 million in March 2020.⁸ In addition, Jordan will have access to a new EU Macro Financial Assistance of €500 million, agreed in December 2019.⁹ In March 2020 Jordan was confronted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which will severely affect economic activity, including tourist revenue, and add additional burdens to public services, especially health.

The rules of origin scheme for exports to the European Union has been expanded in scope and duration during 2019 and has seen increases in the number of firms and volume of exports, but these remain small in the context of overall trade. Employment overall in factories eligible for the scheme rose by 13% in 2019 over 2018 to 1,150, and employment of Syrians rose 26% to 355¹⁰. One major challenge is the difficulty in advocating for employers

⁴ UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Operations Portal, [link](#)

⁵ Jordan Response Plan, [link](#)

⁶ Department of Statistics Labour Force Survey for 2019, 4th Quarter

⁷ Jordan Monitoring and Assessment Framework.

⁸ Jordan agrees \$1.3 billion IMF programme: state news agency, Reuters, Jan 2020, [link](#)

⁹ Commission welcomes agreement on €500 million Macro-Financial Assistance programme for Jordan, European Commission, Dec 2019, [link](#)

¹⁰ Monitoring and Assessment Framework.

to hire more Syrian workers on their production lines, when the benefits of the scheme are not fully visible. Exports under the scheme increased threefold in 2019 to €56.3 million, which is a significant achievement, and reflects the extended time periods required for initiatives such as this to have an impact. This example could open the door to other measures promoting growth and job creation in parallel with traditional development cooperation. Overall exports from Jordan rose by 8.1% in the first nine months of 2019 over the same period in 2018¹¹. All of these gains, however, are threatened by COVID-19, which will place many domestic companies under severe pressure and exacerbate the problems of unemployment.

In January 2020, the number of UNHCR registered refugees was 654,692, a reduction of 16,859 or 2.5% from the January 2019 figure of 671,551.¹² There were 30,687 returns in 2019 and very limited third country settlement.¹³ Conditions remained unsuitable for safe returns to Syria. Most Syrian refugees have been registered and issued with Ministry of Interior (Mol) cards, including through a special regularisation project, conducted in close cooperation between GoJ and UNHCR. The number of Syrians with Mol cards at the end of 2019 was 719,933.¹⁴ This figure exceeds the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR, and reflects GoJ efforts to issue Mol cards to all Syrians in Jordan who apply and not just refugees.

Labour market liberalisation has given Syrian refugees greater access to work, particularly in the agriculture, manufacturing and construction sectors, despite increased pressure in the labour market for Jordanians. Restrictions remain however, with the number of closed sectors for foreign labour, including Syrians, increased in late 2019.¹⁵ There are continuing barriers to the employment of Syrians, especially in skilled occupations. Economic participation rates for women remain very low. The labour market is characterised by high levels of informality and declining working conditions in some sectors for both Syrians and Jordanians.¹⁶ Foreign investment rose by 27% between 2015 and 2017, but then fell by more than 50% in 2018.¹⁷ Figures for the first three quarters of 2019 suggest a further decline of 10%.¹⁸

The reversal of policy changes on health during 2019 allowed Syrians to once again access health services at subsidised costs (equivalent to Jordanian non-insured rates). Education enrolment has met targets, but concerns remain about educational quality with educational outcomes low by international standards (PISA scores in 2018 were on average 15% below the OECD average).¹⁹ Recent trends in quality, however, have been positive. PISA 2018 results shows that Jordan has made steady improvement in learning outcomes for 15-year-olds in science, mathematics and reading after initially flat or even declining (mathematics) trends

¹¹ Jordan Times, 25 November 2019, [link](#)

¹² UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, Operations Portal, [link](#)

¹³ Monitoring and Assessment Framework.

¹⁴ Monitoring and Assessment Framework.

¹⁵ Ministry of Labour Resolution 19, 2019

¹⁶ Fafo, The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan 2017-18 survey, 2019, [link](#)

¹⁷ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

¹⁸ Jordan Foreign Direct Investment, Trading Economics, [link](#)

¹⁹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

between 2006 and 2012.²⁰ Dropout rates for Syrians above 15 years old remain high. Fafo 2017-2018 shows that only 48% of Syrian 15 year olds are attending school and only 25% of secondary students (G11-12) are enrolled.²¹ There also remain significant concerns about violence against women in Jordan and child marriage, including amongst Syrian refugee girls.

The Jordan Compact and subsequent commitments from Brussels meetings have been reciprocal in nature. Donors have provided substantial financial support, including loans and grants. This has been both to refugees and to resilience programmes for host communities impacted by the refugee crisis²² and the financing has helped to significantly relieve the pressure on Jordan's resources. Financial pledges for the Syria crisis as a whole at the Brussels III meeting in March 2019 exceeded those in the 2018 meetings.²³ The latest JORISS data shows a decline in donor support for Jordan under the JRP from \$1.6 billion in 2018 to \$1.2 billion in 2019. GoJ state that in 2019 the JRP requirements were reduced to show only the top priorities, but funding was about 50% of requirements, which was less than previous years.²⁴ The latest data from the post-Brussels financial monitoring exercise, however, shows \$952 million disbursed in Jordan against Brussels pledges of \$685 million during 2019.²⁵ This is an increase in funding contributions to Jordan during 2019, compared to figures for 2018. These different sets of financial data remain unreconciled.

4. Implementation of commitments

4.1 Economic – Livelihoods

Summary of commitments

- 200,000 job opportunities to be provided for Syrian refugees, subject to conditions laid out in the detailed commitments
- Labour market reform to remove, where possible, barriers to working for Syrian refugees without competing with Jordanians
- IC support for livelihoods, employment creation and skill matching programmes
- IC and GoJ to support women's empowerment and labour market participation
- Promoting livelihoods and decent work for Jordanians and Syrian refugees
- Create a clear framework for the establishment of businesses including joint ventures

²⁰ PISA assessment 2018 as compared to 2012 Assessment, [link](#)

²¹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

²² The average Appeal response in 2018 was 60.5% (see data from OCHA), 2018, [link](#)

²³ See Development Initiatives reports

²⁴ Jordan Response Plan, [link](#)

²⁵ Development Initiatives, April 2020

The original vision of the Jordan Compact was that employment of Syrians would be of benefit both to the refugees and to the wider economy. 47,766 work permits were issued to Syrians in 2019, an increase of 4.6% over 2018.²⁶ The percentage issued to women remains very low, but rose from 4.5% to 5.8% in the same period.²⁷ This low figure for women reflects a range of cultural and economic factors and mirrors low female labour market participation in the regions of Syria from which most of the refugees have come. The overall percentage of economically active women in Jordan remains low and has fallen from 16.3% in 2017 to 15.8% in 2018 and 14.4% in 2019.²⁸ The figure for Syrians is much lower, and stood at 7% in 2018.²⁹

Jordan remains in the lowest 10% of countries in the Global Gender Gap ranking and its ranking in 2019 (138/153) remained unchanged from 2018.³⁰ There has been some progress in economic opportunity and political empowerment, but substantial inequalities persist. Amendments to the Labour Law proposed in 2017 to support women's access to markets are still to be implemented. In December 2018 the Minister of Labour introduced positive changes for women, including expansion in the sectors in which they can work and removal of restrictions on working hours including evening working hours. The Labour Law was also amended in 2019 to mandate employers to offer child care facilities if the parents working there have 15 or more children under five years of age.

Cumulative work permits issued were 176,920 from January 2016 until December 2019.³¹ It is not possible to know how many of these represent separate individuals who are employed. A substantial part of the economy remains informal, and nearly half of all working-age Syrians are estimated to be working informally.³² Implementation of policies and regulations related to access to the labour market for Syrians is often administratively complicated.

There have been some efforts by GoJ to remove barriers to labour market participation. The GoJ relaxed policies to allow more inclusion of Syrian refugees in the formal workforce by issuing flexible work permits in the agriculture and construction sectors, allowing work permits portability to different sectors, excluding Syrians refugees from the 25% reduction of migrants³³ and permitting the issuance of short-term work permits. These measures contributed to stronger legal and social protection, offering the possibility of formalisation, but the heavy focus on agricultural permits limits this. This is because the agricultural sector is not covered by the work inspection regime and social benefits that come with permits for other sectors are not mandatory. There has been limited progress on the Decent Work agenda in

²⁶ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

²⁷ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

²⁸ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

²⁹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

³⁰ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

³¹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

³² Jordan Response Plan, 2019

³³ Under the National Empowerment and Employment Programme in the manufacturing sector

2019, but with some improvements in the garment sector driven by an enhanced inspection regime.

At the same time GoJ has increased the sectors in which non-Jordanians are prohibited from working, and issued a new list in 2019 of 15 closed categories, including office work, sales, hairdressing, drivers and guards, and 13 restricted categories.³⁴ These sectors cover many of the main areas that refugees wish to work in. The Fafo 2017-2018 study suggested that, for Syrian refugees, employment in the informal sector was at least twice the level of formal employment.³⁵

Jordanians face severe unemployment with a rate of 19.0% overall and 44% youth unemployment in the final quarter of 2019. The unemployment rate for young people aged 15-19 is 48.7%, and for those aged 20-24 years the unemployment rate is 38.5%.³⁶ A quarter of Jordanian graduates are jobless. Unemployment for Syrians, however, has fallen from 61% in 2014 to 25% in 2018.³⁷ The average unemployment rate of governorates with the most massive influx of refugees has increased by about 3.3% since the beginning of the Syrian Refugee Crisis, while noting that the majority of refugees work informally and those in formal employment are mainly replacing migrant labour. Labour force participation likewise slightly reduced in the governorates with a large influx of refugees.³⁸ In the light of this, the Jordan National Renaissance Project and the National Employment Charter, launched in 2019, have a strong focus on Jordanians, with an aim to “generate more jobs for Jordanians” and “gradually replace foreign workers”. In July 2019 Prime Minister Omar Razzaz launched the 2019-2025 National Strategy for Youth, aimed at developing the younger generation’s creativity and increasing its productivity.

Thirteen employment centres funded by the EU and the Netherlands have been established through ILO, the Ministry of Labour, including the Syrian Refugee Directorate in camps, and other stakeholders, to provide services to Syrian refugees and Jordanians, including two centres in Azraq and Za’atari refugee camps. A total of 14,292 people have been employed through job matching programmes, including 5,056 Syrians.³⁹ IC-funded programmes have more than doubled the number of employed placements in 7 months. This comes primarily through ILO employment centres increasing their output of ‘all employed’ from 4,419 to 13,540.⁴⁰ The ILO has also provided training and Recognition of Prior Learning support. The World Bank has played an important role with its Program for Results (P4R) and disbursement-linked indicators to reduce unemployment and support formalisation of Syrian jobs.

³⁴ Ministry of Labour Resolution No.19/2019

³⁵ Fafo, The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan, 2017-18, [link](#)

³⁶ DOS (2019) Labor Force Quarterly Survey, [link](#)

³⁷ Fafo, The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan, 2017-18, [link](#)

³⁸ IMF (2017) Jordan Selected Issues. IMF Country Report No 17/232 Washington D.C

³⁹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁴⁰ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

GoJ is encouraging the formation of businesses by Syrians. GoJ amended the Investment Law Regulation for non-Jordanian Investors (Regulation No. 77-2016) in 2019 so that equity restrictions on foreign investment in additional sectors (mainly in services) were removed to unlock growth, create jobs, and support export diversification. Of the 51 items that allow up to 50% foreign equity ownership, 22 activities and services have been fully liberalized (100 % foreign ownership allowed). They encompass renting and leasing activities, business services (such as tourism-related services), some transport auxiliary services in maritime, road, and air transport, and warehousing and storage services. Good progress has been made but more work remains to be done in areas such as financial inclusion, which the GoJ is currently addressing through several programmes.

Progress has been made in the expansion of Job Centres and the new registration arrangements for home-based businesses (HBBs), which at the end of 2019 covered 919 HBBs, up by 95% since June 2018.⁴¹ The majority of these (546) are owned by women, but very few (22) by Syrians.⁴² This is despite the process of registration of HBBs being the same for Jordanians and Syrians and GoJ undertaking campaigns to provide information and raise awareness. This is partly because of lower levels of home ownership and financial assets amongst Syrian refugees. In December 2018 GoJ allowed HBB for Syrian refugees in tailoring, food processing and handicrafts, but it took a year for the first Syrian-owned HBB to be registered, with strong external support, given the complex procedures involved.⁴³ HBBs are an ideal fit for the lifestyles of many female Syrian refugees, but they continue to keep their businesses in the informal sector rather than seeking registration.

4.2 Economic - Trade and Investment

Summary of commitments

- **Tariff-free access to EU markets based on revised Rules of Origin linked to employment of 15% of Syrians in factories in Special Economic Zones (open to the whole country since 2018)**
- **IC to provide technical support to GoJ and firms to take advantage of these opportunities**
- **IC to promote increased investment and support for investment promotion**
- **Improved business environment, including predictable regulatory framework through GoJ reforms**

⁴¹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁴² Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁴³ Fees are generally low at JD10-40 with perhaps an additional JD 30 in other costs (see for example: [The Start Up Guide](#)), but the process requiring pre-approvals prior to registration can be slow and cumbersome.

With a very high public debt of over 96% of GDP at the end of 2019, GoJ has maintained fiscal consolidation and regulatory reform linked to IMF programmes, in close consultation with the World Bank and international donors. This led to a successful second review of the IMF's Extended Fund Facility in May 2019 and a new IMF programme in March 2020.⁴⁴ This consists of \$1.3 billion support with a first instalment of \$140m by the end of March and eight further instalments over a four-year programme.⁴⁵ The EU has committed €500 million of Macro Financial Assistance, endorsed by the European Council in December 2019, which was supplemented in the form of an additional soft loan of €200 million in April 2020.⁴⁶ The IMF programme will focus on efforts to spur economic growth that has hovered at around 2% per year in the last decade. The IMF forecast Jordanian economic growth of 2.1% in 2020 in January 2020, but this was reduced to -3.7% in the World Economic Outlook in April 2020 in the light of COVID-19.

The IMF have noted that Jordan's structural reform agenda was "designed to improve the investment climate and reduce costs to businesses, which will make it easier to create jobs while also protecting Jordan's poor and most vulnerable." Other programmes are being undertaken to enhance investment. The London Initiative was launched at a major conference in February 2019. It aims to provide a forum for expanding private sector investment linked to the GoJ reforms under the Five-Year Reform Matrix. GoJ, DFID and the World Bank launched the Jordan Taskforce in September 2019, with senior representatives from international donors and financial institutions attending the event. The MoPIC Minister provided an update on the economic situation and progress against the GoJ's priorities for the next five years and presented a diagnosis of Jordan's macroeconomic situation, assessment of key risks and opportunities and the path to accelerating growth and job creation, including an overview of financing needs for next year. Donors responded by setting out their commitments to Jordan and their planned support for the implementation of the key reforms outlined in the Five-Year Reform Matrix.

Impressive progress has been made in improving the business climate. Jordan was ranked 75th out of 190 countries by the World Bank in 2020 Doing Business Report, up by 29 places from a year earlier when it was 104/190.⁴⁷ This significant jump classified Jordan as one of the 'top three improvers' in the ranking over the past year and was mainly a result of significant improvement with regard to the access of private firms to credit, 'paying taxes' and resolving insolvency. During the last quarter of 2019, the Government of Jordan launched a stimulus programme focused on improving the business environment and creating investment incentives for companies in Jordan, job creation and providing affordable housing for low-

44 Summary: Jordan's New IMF-Supported Programme, IMF, [link](#)

45 Summary: Jordan's New IMF-Supported Programme, IMF, [link](#)

46 Summary: Jordan's New IMF-Supported Programme, IMF, [link](#). See also [the news](#).

47 Summary: Jordan's New IMF-Supported Programme, IMF, [link](#)

income families. There is, however, no specific gender lens in the Investment Law. The efficiency of the stimulus package will be measured in 2020.

The GoJ is measuring improvements in the predictability of its regulations. The predictability framework, through e-consultation, is being piloted with six government entities (the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply; the Jordan Investment Commission; the Jordan Customs; the Income and Sales Tax Department; the Ministry of Labor; and the Greater Amman Municipality). The Reform Secretariat at MoPIC has worked with these six government entities on implementation through the execution of three key activities: 1) mapping of the current process to issue new laws and regulations within each entity; 2) designing a new process to conduct e-consultation; and 3) working with each entity to ensure they are well trained to implement the e-consultation process. The official implementation of this started on 1 September 2019. The Code of Governance became effective in January 2019, making it mandatory for all laws, regulations, strategies and major government decisions to go through a process of public consultations. At present, a significant part of these public consultations is organized through the website of the Legislation and Opinion Bureau.

Despite these improvements, however, foreign direct investment (FDI) continues to fall. According to data from UNCTAD, FDI inflows totalled to US\$ 950 million in 2018⁴⁸, showing a decrease of over 50% compared to the previous year (US\$ 2.0 billion). Estimated at US\$ 35 billion, the total stock of FDI represents 82.9% of the country's GDP.⁴⁹ Figures for the first three quarters of 2019 suggest a further decline of 10% in FDI.⁵⁰ In order to boost FDI flows, the Government has planned large-scale infrastructure projects (water, transportation, nuclear energy) for which it needs foreign and private funds. The 2020 State Budget will increase capital expenditure by 33% compared to the 2019. The GoJ justifies this increase in capital expenditures as an investment to attract private investors into Public Private Partnerships (PPP), which the GoJ believes can be a tool to create new jobs, boost the economy and improve infrastructures.

Jordan has implemented major fiscal and structural measures in the last few years. However, the impact of negative external shocks has reduced GoJ's capacity to invest in growth and mitigate the impact of the economic crisis on ordinary Jordanians. GoJ is turning to the private sector to take forward the next stage of development. PPPs form the cornerstone of this strategy. A national PPP program is intended to be a driving force for economic growth and employment through well-defined shared ventures in infrastructure, utilities, and service sectors.

⁴⁸ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁴⁹ World Investment Report 2019, UNCTAD, [link](#)

⁵⁰ Jordan Foreign Direct Investment, Trading Economics, [link](#)

A centrepiece of the Jordan Compact was the agreement with the EU for enhanced Rules of Origin (RoO). In 2019 there was continued simplification of rules to lower entry barriers for Jordanian companies exporting to Europe. New instructions on RoO were published in the EU Official Gazette 4056 in May 2019, and established the requirement that benefitting factories participate in Better Work. GoJ's published "Instructions for Inspection of Factories Benefiting from the Decision of the Jordanian-European Partnership Committee on Simplifying the Rules of Origin of Jordanian Export Factories to the European Union" that provided inspection instructions for enterprises that benefit from the relaxed RoO scheme for export to the EU. These came into effect as of July 2019, when it was published in the official gazette, but this was too late to make the necessary inspections during 2019. The overall scope and duration of the scheme was also improved and expanded during 2019 as summarised below:

Original RoO Agreement	Amendments agreed in 2019
The RoO agreement extends to 2026.	The RoO agreement extends to 2030.
To qualify, the products have to be manufactured in 18 designated development zones.	Geographic restrictions for manufactured products are lifted.
Requirement to have at least 15% Syrian labour per factory in the first two years and 25% as of year three.	Requirement to have at least 15% Syrian labour throughout the life of the agreement. Syrians have to have a valid work permit to be counted.
Once Jordan achieves 200,000 work permits overall, the EU and Jordan will discuss further simplifying the support through the RoO agreement.	Once Jordan achieves 60,000 legal and active Job opportunities (in particular corresponding to active work permits or measurable means corresponding to legal and active employment determined by the Association Committee), the requirement of having 15% Syrian workers within each facility is lifted and the overall provisions of the agreement are simplified.

Exports and employment through the scheme remain low, but did increase significantly in 2019. Many of the firms that are exporting are larger businesses with experience of exporting to US markets. Employment overall in factories eligible for the scheme rose 13% to 1150, and employment of Syrians rose 26% to 355.⁵¹ Exports under the scheme increased threefold to

⁵¹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

€56.4 million.⁵² Some firms, however, prefer to employ third country nationals rather than Jordanians or Syrians. There is little evidence of small, local firms being able to take advantage of the scheme. The majority of potential employees are women, but the scheme does not recognise their unique constraints, in terms of childcare, transportation and personal security.

Projects for Firm Level Assistance for exports fell from 13 in 2018 to 11 in 2019⁵³, including closure of projects funded by USAID, EBRD and GiZ. In January 2020 MoPIC launched a new three-year program entitled the “Competitiveness Reinforcement Initiative (CRI)” in partnership with the World Bank that aims to strengthen the competitiveness of key export-oriented companies in two key Agribusiness Value Chains. The proposed activities under this program will support the GoJ in designing and implementing reforms that will improve performance of Jordanian firms.

In December 2019 the Growth Lab at Harvard University headed by Professor Ricardo Hausmann published a major study on Jordan.⁵⁴ This identifies sectors with potential for export growth. It concludes:

“Applying newly developed complexity measures and the Industry Space reveals the following strategic export themes for Jordan: (1) Business, IT and Professional Services, (2) Education Services, (3) Healthcare Services, (4) Creative Industries, (5) Tourism, (6) Transportation and Logistics, (7) Construction Materials and Services, and (8) Agriculture and Food Processing. Each of these export themes includes a number of specific industries, which either already have a strong presence in Jordan and could continue to support export and wage growth or would be likely to succeed in Jordan given their relatedness to existing capabilities and know how.”

There is no donor group on private sector development and the business environment, which remains a big gap.

4.3 Social - Education

Summary of commitments

- **Increased Syrian enrolment in formal education, with free public education provided to at least 140,000 Syrian children in 2016 and 190,000 at the end of 2017. (These targets overestimated the number of Syrian children and were revised**

⁵² MoPIC monthly report January 2020; data as at 24 December 2019

⁵³ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁵⁴ A Roadmap for Investment Promotion and Export Diversification: The Case of Jordan, December 2019, [link](#)

downwards in 2016).

- **Opportunities for free certified education for every child to achieve the ambition of all Syrian children in education (this is supported by IC funding)**
- **Predictable, multiyear funding and technical support from IC**

The GoJ has adopted inclusive policies to boost the school enrolment rate of Syrian refugees. It has established the double shift system for Syrian refugee children in 209 schools in Jordan to expand capacity. It set up a 'grace periods' for the 2018-2019 school year, enabling all children to enrol in schools in Jordan, regardless of their nationality or documentation status. The Education Dashboard⁵⁵ reports that the enrolment of Syrian children in Jordanian schools in the 2019/20 school year reached 136,437.⁵⁶ This is a 2% increase from the first semester of last year (with an 8% increase in the camp schools). 51% of enrolled students are female. There is no new data for age related enrolment, but 2018 data demonstrated very low rates of enrolment for 16 year olds, but with positive increases in retention rates since 2014 for 14 and 15-year olds. Fafo 2017- 2018 shows that only 48% of Syrian 15 year olds are attending school and only 25% of secondary students (G11-12) are enrolled.⁵⁷

Concerns remain about educational quality, with educational outcomes low by international standards. 52% of children in Jordan at late primary age today are not proficient in reading, adjusted for Out-of-School children.⁵⁸ PISA 2018 results showed that average scores for Jordanian pupils were 15% below the OECD average.⁵⁹ Recent trends however, have been positive. The 2018 PISA results also showed that Jordan has made steady improvements in learning outcomes for 15-year-olds in science, mathematics and reading after initially flat or even declining (mathematics) trends between 2006 and 2012.⁶⁰ In September 2019 Jordan suffered a one-month teachers strike for higher pay. This affected educational provision and was ended when the GoJ agreed salary increases for the teachers. The education at schools accommodating Syrian refugees in double-shift schools, however, was not interrupted during the strike and continued smoothly.

Syrian children lag behind Jordanian children for pre-school education. Net Attendance Ratios for Syrians are 10 percentage points lower than Jordanians at basic level, and 47 percentage points lower at secondary level.⁶¹ The UN estimates that there are 83,920 Syrian refugee children out of school.⁶² It is likely that this includes a large number of adolescents and may

⁵⁵ Education Quarterly Dashboard, Q4 2019, ISWG, [link](#).

⁵⁶ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁵⁷ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁵⁸ World Bank (2019) Learning Poverty in Jordan

⁵⁹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁶⁰ PISA assessment 2018 as compared to 2012 Assessment, [link](#)

⁶¹ Jordan Population and Family Health Survey 2017-2018

⁶² Investing in the Future, Protection and Learning for All Syrian Children and Youth, March 2019, [link](#)

also be influenced by differences in the estimation of overall refugee numbers. Children out of school figures remain contested.

New figures show illiteracy for those over 15 years old gradually reducing overall, with strong differences between male and female illiteracy rates. For non-Jordanians, illiteracy has fallen from 10.0% in 2018 to 9.7% in 2019, but this hides a reduction from 8.6% to 7.4% for men and an increase from 12.3% to 13.8% for women.⁶³

More girls are enrolled in education than boys at all levels⁶⁴ and that the number of married women aged 15-49 who have been through higher education is rising over time.⁶⁵ International and local studies estimate the percentage of students with disabilities as 10% of the total number of students. Figures issued by the Department of Statistics indicate that approximately 79% of the total number of persons with disabilities of school age do not receive any form of education⁶⁶, despite MoE having programs for inclusive education. The MoE has included inclusive education under the JRP, but funding has not been adequate to meet the needs.⁶⁷

Questions remain about the level and trends of quality in education. Learning conditions, including overcrowded and poorly maintained schools, poor basic pedagogical equipment and tools and the inadequate training of teachers, remain a vast problem and contribute to the decision of students to drop out. These conditions are exacerbated for Syrian refugee children who have largely been placed in afternoon school shifts in host communities, with fewer teaching hours. VAF 2019 indicates, however, that cultural and social norms (how Syrian refugees perceive and value education) are the main reason for dropping out of school. Syrian children, particularly those in camps, are performing far below the national average. As a response to this, MoE has allowed Syrian teachers to work as assistant teachers in schools in refugee camps, but there are barriers to the employment of Syrians as full teachers. Furthermore, the multifaceted violence in and around the school, perpetuated both by children and school staff, affects all school children. 2018/19 figures from the Ministry of Education online survey show a reduction in physical and verbal violence against children in camp schools, but an increase in host communities.

The GoJ took significant steps in 2019 to revise curricula and textbooks, and introduce standardised tests. The Early Grade Reading and Maths Project has been supporting improvements to early grade education since 2014, with good results.⁶⁸ Challenges are related to methods for learning and assessment which are often out-dated, and based on rote

⁶³ Department of Statistics 2019, Labour Force Survey, 2019 – Fourth Round

⁶⁴ Jordan Population and Family Health Survey 2017-2018

⁶⁵ According to World Bank data, gender parity was achieved in 1980. World Bank, School Enrolment primary (gross), Gender Parity Index, [link](#)

⁶⁶ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁶⁷ Education Strategic Plan 2018-2022, Ministry of Education, [link](#)

⁶⁸ See, for example, RAMP midline survey, [link](#)

learning and corporal punishment. The development of career pathways for teacher and the expansion of pre- and in-service teacher development aim at addressing these challenges.

Following the London Conference in 2016, donors significantly increased the level of resourcing made available to the education sector. JRP funding figures suggest that this trend has now reversed. There was a further reduction in support for the Education sector reported under the JRP in 2019. Donor support as recorded under the JRP fell by 5% from \$158m in 2018 to \$150m in 2019⁶⁹, with a shift from resilience to budget support. This follows a much steeper fall from 2017, when the figure was \$296 million.⁷⁰ As a percentage of the JRP requested funds, the fall was even more dramatic from 88% in 2017 to 48% in 2018 and 35% in 2019.⁷¹ This is despite the GoJ's view that the JRP 2019 decreased the financial requirements to reflect only the top priorities.⁷² This interpretation of declining funding for education is, however, questioned by donors who continue to provide substantial support to the sector. The lack of reconciliation of financial data makes it very difficult to draw authoritative conclusions in this area.

The education sector has demonstrated good aid effectiveness practices. Donors are providing budget support through a multi-donor account, and other projects have been increasingly integrated into the public-school system under GoJ budgets, recording key successes in refugee enrolment. The 'Accelerating Access to Quality Formal Education for Syrian Refugee Children' initiative included the creation of the multi-donor account alongside other modalities, with significant budget support, which was then copied in the health sector. The 2018-2022 Education Sector Plan (ESP) provided a nationally led sector strategy. Concerns have been expressed about the ESP, however, in terms of its consistency with the JRP and the fact that it does not have enough focus on children out of school, which remains a highly contentious area for gathering data and reaching conclusions. The partnership foreseen in ESP is operational, but there are challenges because not all the proposed "Task Work Groups" are fully functional, and MoE is working alongside partners to mobilize them.

Success factors in the education sector include a shared understanding between GoJ and the international community in delivering an integrated approach to planning and budgeting; a common view of the role of the Ministry of Education (MoE) in the lead; donors and the MoE jointly using common planning and reporting tools and coming up with a 'common results framework'. Donors such as Canada, DFID, USAID and others contributed to the multi-donor account with MoE, with complementary funding from EU and Germany. In addition, MOE set up a Development Coordination Unit that is specifically responsible for coordination and reporting. Key implementers include UNESCO on specialized expertise for plan implementation, monitoring and reporting and UNICEF on programming. As a result, school

⁶⁹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁷⁰ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁷¹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁷² Jordan Response Plan, [link](#)

enrolment of refugees has been a key success. Under the Jordan Compact, the GoJ committed to enrolling 130,000 Syrian children by the end of 2019, a figure that was exceeded.⁷³

4.4 Social – Health

Summary of commitments

- Provide Syrian refugees with equitable access to national health care systems
- Apply best practices and lessons learnt from other sectors (especially education) to the health sector

UNHCR provides comprehensive primary, secondary and tertiary health care services free of charge for refugees in Azraq and Za'atari camps and for vulnerable Syrians in urban areas. The performance of the public health sector for Syrian refugees over the past few years, however, has been dominated by the evolution of policy regarding the charges that they have to pay, which in turn has significant implications for access. Up until 2018, Syrians received highly subsidised access to health services. The introduction of a health policy in February 2018 that required Syrians to pay 80% of the non-Jordanians' rate⁷⁴ had a significant impact on their access to health, and necessitated negative coping mechanisms, including selling household assets and goods, and pulling children out of school and into work.⁷⁵ It led to at least a tripling of costs at point of use in the public system, and an increase in out of pocket expenditure. The proportion of Syrians needing health services in the previous month who sought them in the public sector fell from 78% in 2016 to 45% in 2018. However, throughout this period Syrian refugees continued to be exempted from fees for primary and maternity and child health services, including vaccines, provided at the maternity and childhood centers of MoH.

The 2018 cut of subsidies and the imposition of foreigner rates severely impacted the Syrian refugee population. The policy change occurred at a time when access to essential medicine and health services for Syrian refugees was already deteriorating and refugees were increasingly self-medicating or forgoing medical treatment.⁷⁶ The cut in subsidies largely impacted the most vulnerable households, particularly those with elderly, chronic disease patients and persons with disability. It led to large decrease in the number of Syrians accessing public health services⁷⁷, with much of the population resorting to self-medication,

⁷³ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁷⁴ They were previously paying 20% of the non-insured Jordanian rate.

⁷⁵ JIF note on the consequences of the new health policy for Syrian refugees.

⁷⁶ UNHCR, Health utilization survey 2017-19

⁷⁷ IRC- Impact and Effect of health policy changes on vulnerable Syrian refugee communities in North Jordan (March 2019)

reducing their numbers of visits to the doctor or delaying consultations with the risk of worsening their medical conditions. High medical costs led to a surge in household debt, which will continue to have a long-lasting impact.⁷⁸

On 29 March 2019 the GoJ reversed the decision to increase health charges to Syrian refugees made in February 2018. Awareness of this policy reversal was slow to be disseminated amongst Syrians and remains below 50%.⁷⁹ It is also noted that none of these benefits apply to non-Syrian refugees. Some secondary and tertiary care remains unaffordable for Syrians, but trends in access have been positive over the past year and there were strong grounds for optimism prior to the advent of COVID-19, which will put severe strains on the health system. In this regard, the Department of Health has stated that the protocols for treatment of Syrians will be the same as for Jordanians during the current crisis, which is a very positive decision.

As part of the discussions about reversing the pricing policy, development partners engaged in discussions with the GoJ to explore options to reduce barriers to access to health care services provided by the MoH. It was agreed that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Government of Denmark would establish a multi-donor account, named the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees (JHFR). The World Bank provided technical inputs on estimating health care costs for Syrian refugees. On December 16, 2018, the GoJ and the donors signed a joint financing agreement to create the JHFR to offset health care costs for Syrian refugees. The disbursement of donor contributions from the JHFR was contingent on the reversal of the payment policy to the pre-2018 rate. The Multi-Donor Account (MDA) grew in size and influence over the course of 2019, with Canada and Qatar also making contributions, while in parallel, the World Bank and Spain increasingly supported the health sector and the EU stepped in to provide funding towards the costs of “vaccinations for all”. 86% of children aged 12-23 months have received all basic vaccinations, while 7% of children in this age group have not received any vaccinations.⁸⁰ Support provided to MoH through the MDA supports MoH, yet it does not cover all the costs that MoH has to bear as a result of the Syria crisis, including the primary and secondary healthcare subsidies. MDA support is proving to be very flexible in the context of the COVID-19 crisis.

Substantial new health data has been provided by the Jordan Population and Family Health Survey 2017/18, published in March 2019, which generally shows positive trends in health indicators and provides disaggregated data for Syrians. This disaggregation shows striking differences for fertility and teenage pregnancies. The average number of children among Syrian women is 4.7, as compared with 2.6 for Jordanian women, and 19% of Syrian women

⁷⁸ IRC- Impact and Effect of health policy changes on vulnerable Syrian refugee communities in North Jordan (March 2019)

⁷⁹ Internal Rescue Committee, Monthly Monitoring Reports

⁸⁰ Jordan Population and Health Survey 2017/18.

aged 15 to 19 have already had a child, compared to 2% of Jordanian women.⁸¹ 28% of Syrian teenagers have begun childbearing compared to 3% of Jordanian teenage women.⁸²

Evidence from the Jordan Population and Family Health Survey 2017/18 (published in March 2019)

- Access to healthcare (data is representative of the whole country unless otherwise stated)
 - 71% of inpatients treated at public facilities
 - 61% free of charge; 20% paid JD200 or more
 - 52% of Jordanians but only 21% of Syrians, consulted public health facilities as outpatients
 - 51% of patients were treated free of charge; 6% paid JD100 or more
- Outcomes
 - 100% of births were with skilled attendants both in 2012 and in 2017/18
 - Under-five mortality (from 39 to 19 per 1,000) and Infant mortality (from 34 to 17 per 1000) have both halved from 1990 to 2017/18

In 2019, MoH requested certain NGOs and specific projects to provide data on beneficiaries so they could keep track of them and follow on their treatment as they are referred to MoH facilities. NGOs expressed concerns that this would compromise patient confidentiality.

4.5 Social - Social Protection

Summary of commitments

- Social protection was highlighted as a sector to address in Brussels II
- IC and GOJ to maximise use of cash support as an efficient and effective modality
- This sector also encompasses significant gender issues related to child marriage, women's vulnerability and violence against women

The social protection system in Jordan is expected to prevent the most vulnerable and excluded groups from suffering from shocks, and to enable human capital development within

⁸¹ Jordan Population and Health Survey 2017/18

⁸² Monitoring and Assessment Framework

the framework of the ongoing structural challenges in the economy. This is in line with evidence from other countries where social protection has proven to be one of the ways to strengthen the linkages between humanitarian and development responses, by addressing underlying poverty and vulnerability, providing a means to respond to crises and support localisation of humanitarian action.

The absolute poverty rate in Jordan for all the population stood at 14.4% in 2010, and increased to 15.7% in 2018, meaning that more than 1 million Jordanians live below the poverty line.⁸³ 78% of the Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR are highly or severely vulnerable, living below the Jordanian poverty line.⁸⁴ The 2019 Vulnerability Assessment Framework (UNHCR) also highlighted high level of debt and dependency amongst Syrian refugees. A joint assessment for Syrian refugees has been prepared across three UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF) with the potential for a fully joint assessment including Jordanians and Syrians with GoJ by 2022.

In May 2019 the GoJ launched its National Social Protection Strategy 2019-2025 (NSPS), which lays out GoJ's approach in terms of decent work, social security and employment. It lists three strategic pillars (dignity, empowerment and opportunity) to provide a comprehensive social protection system for all Jordanians. There is also some coverage for "non-Jordanians," but the strategy mainly focuses on Jordanians. A more comprehensive approach would allow for needs based programming across all populations. In May 2019, the Council of Ministers approved an action plan outlining specific activities and measures for the overall implementation of the strategy. This more comprehensive approach to social protection provides a potential pathway for the transition to more needs-based development programming if all communities are included.

The NSPS is in line with the National Renaissance Project and the GoJ's priorities for 2019-20 to build a comprehensive and integrated social protection system that will protect Jordanians from falling into the poverty trap. Under the leadership of MoPIC and the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), the strategy emphasizes access to education and health and women's access to the labour market for the underprivileged segments of the population. UN agencies backed by key donors are committed to investing in support of multi-year funding and technical assistance for the development of the national system.

UNHCR and WFP cash assistance to Syrians have shown small increases in 2019. In comparison to 2018, the figures show:

- An increase in 1.7% in UNHCR disbursements to \$60.3m and a 6.4% increase in beneficiaries to 146,011; and
- An increase of 3.6% in WFP disbursements to \$97.7m and a 5.4% increase in beneficiaries to 334,389.

⁸³ National Social Protection Strategy-Jordan (2019). GoJ and UNICEF.

⁸⁴ Vulnerability Assessment Framework 2019 (UNHCR), [link](#)

Partners to the Common Cash Facility have increased by five in the last year (from 25 to 30), but disbursements were down 61% to \$116m from the extremely high levels of 2018 (\$301m), to levels more in line with 2016 and 2017. Graduation strategies and sustainability for cash programming remain unclear.

In December 2019 the EU Trust Fund agreed €59m of support for social protection for refugees in Jordan with the vision of strengthening the self-reliance of the most vulnerable refugees⁸⁵, Syrians in particular, as well as host communities, towards the establishment of an inclusive national social protection system. The EU has invested substantially in social protection and the UK government is planning to invest £100 million in expanding the NAF including cash transfers for the poor and the vulnerable as well as technical assistance to improve targeting, conditionality and sustainability. These approaches are preferred by donors to the option of setting up parallel approaches to support specific groups.

DFID is also in the process of finalising an emergency cash assistance programme as part of COVID-19 response for Jordan. £25m has been earmarked to be disbursed in the next six months. This will be followed by a comprehensive Social Protection programme of support to the GoJ focusing on continued delivery of payments to beneficiaries through the NAF. This will be a seven-year programme working closely with other donors including USAID and the World Bank.

The percentage of financial contributions directed towards interventions that promote gender equality, as measured by UN Women, rose from 2.17% in 2017 to 5.65% in 2019, particularly reflecting an increase in livelihoods programmes under this definition.⁸⁶

Concerns remain in the social protection sector about child marriage, gender-based violence and the full inclusion of people living with disabilities, which GoJ is addressing through planned interventions in each of these areas under the JRP and at the national level through legislation and national strategies. Child marriage amongst Syrians and gender-based violence remain significant social problems. Department of Statistics and Fafo 2017-2018 data show the percentage of Syrian women aged 20-24 in 2017 who were married before age 18 was 42%.

Data in the Jordan Population and Family Health Survey (JPFHS) is now further disaggregated in terms of nationality (Jordanian, Syrian, and other nationality). The overall incidence of violence against women is declining over time, but levels remain high and more Syrian women report gender-based violence than Jordanian women as shown in the box below. Also, Syrian women are less likely to seek help to stop violence compare to Jordanian women (10.4% to 20.7%). The overall number of survivors assisted by the Jordan GBV Information Management System Task Force has increased by 25% in comparison with 2017, based on increased

⁸⁵ EU news, 2019, [link](#).

⁸⁶ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

inclusion and engagement of Jordanian organisations. Furthermore, Jordan has established a National Online Case Management System to deal with all cases of GBV and Violence against Children (VAC) of all nationalities.

Survivor-centred service delivery is needed to address these issues. Both the IC and GoJ are now scaling up efforts to combat violence against women and girls. Examples include the previous establishment of the national level SGBV sub-working group, a coordinating body co-chaired by UNFPA and UNHCR. National frameworks and procedures that aim at preventing and responding to violence against women and children are now in place as well as manuals on GBV and Clinical Management of Rape. This will be particularly important given the likelihood that cases of GBV will rise under the COVID-19 lockdown.

New data and evidence on violence against women 2019

- Jordan Population and Family Health Survey 2017/18 on domestic violence⁸⁷

	2012	2018 (Jordanian; Syrian)
Ever-married women who have experienced physical violence since age 15	34.3%	20.8% (J: 19.8%; S:23.7%)
Ever-married women who have experienced violence within the last month	12.6%	14.4% (J: 13.9%; S: 16.1%)
Ever-married women who have experienced sexual violence within the last month	6%	3.3% (J: 3.5%; S:2.4%)

- Jordan Gender Based Violence (GBV) Task Force 2018 (chaired by UNHCR and UNFPA) Annual Report⁸⁸
 - 2018 Reported incidents: Women 79.7%; girls 17.1%; men 2.0%; boys 1.2%
 - Types of sexual and gender based violence reported: psychological/emotional abuse 47.0%; physical assault 27.9%; forced marriage 9.6%; denial of resources, opportunities or services 10.8%; sexual assault 3.3%; rape 1.4% (Source Jordan GBV Task Force 2018 Annual Report)

⁸⁷ Department of Statistics 2018. *Jordan Population and Family Health Survey 2017-2018*; Department of Statistics 2019, *Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2017-18*

⁸⁸ IMS Task Force 2018 Annual Report, [link](#)

4.6 Protection

Summary of commitments

- **GoJ to expand registration and regularisation of Syrian refugees to achieve comprehensive registration**
- **GoJ facilitating returns that are consistent with International Humanitarian Law and the principle of non-refoulement**
- **GoJ to provide necessary documentation to Syrian refugees**
- **IC to provide increased resettlement and pathways to third countries**

In January 2020, the number of UNHCR registered refugees was 654,692, a reduction of 16,859, or 2.5%, from the January 2019 figure of 671,551, due to returns, resettlement and deaths. The figure of returns reached 30,687 in the 2019 calendar year, compared with a figure of between 7,000 and 8,000 per year for the previous three years. This follows the opening of the border on 15 October 2018 and the end of hostilities in some regions of Syria. However, conditions in general remained unsuitable for safe returns to Syria. The ongoing concerns of refugees over their personal safety (including detention, forced conscription and retaliation) and the availability of services and livelihood opportunities once in Syria are amongst the many challenges that prevent refugees from returning. GoJ and the international community are both committed to voluntary, dignified and safe returns. GoJ have stated that there were zero deportations in 2019.

In mid-2019 UNHCR discussed the possible introduction of return assistance for returnees. Cash assistance for returns creates risks of adverse incentives, but there is no evidence of GoJ applying pressure for refugees to leave. Having raised a set of initial questions regarding the concept, a number of civil society members of the durable solutions groups participated in a technical multi-stakeholder process both at regional and country level. After a thorough assessment of the risks and the potential benefits, it was decided not to proceed actively with these proposals.

11,992 Mol cards were issued in 2019, down significantly from previous years, reflecting the fact that nearly all eligible Syrian refugees now have Mol cards.⁸⁹ The cumulative total is now

⁸⁹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

719,933.⁹⁰ This exceeds the number of registered refugees, since all Syrians in Jordan can apply for MoI cards and not just those registered with UNHCR.

Resettlement to third countries, at 4,843, was up 10% from 2018⁹¹, but has been broadly steady since falling from over 20,000 in 2016, when USA ended their participation in the scheme. The number of Syrians resettled from Jordan to third countries through complementary pathways has always been a low figure, but fell from 76 in 2018 to just 19 in 2019.⁹²

4.7 Partnership - Financial support

Summary of commitments

- **Financial support to Jordan Response Plan maintained at 2016 level**
- **Macroeconomic support to Jordan to address budgetary and balance of payments challenges**
- **Project funding to meet specific commitments**

On 12–14 March 2019, representative of 78 delegations (56 states, 11 regional organisations and international financial institutions (IFIs), and 11 UN agencies) came together to renew and strengthen political, humanitarian and financial commitments for supporting the future of Syria and the region at the Brussels III conference. Hosted by the European Union and co-chaired by the UN, the seventh pledging conference announced grant support for the region amounting to US\$7.0 billion for 2019 and multi-year pledges of close to US\$2.4 billion for 2020 and beyond. IFIs and governments also announced US\$21.0 billion in loans for 2019 and beyond.

In 2019, Jordan received total contributions of US\$4.3 billion, made up predominately of loans (66%, US\$2.8 billion) and grants (27%, US\$1.2 billion). The five largest grant donors combined provided more than three quarters (76% or US\$878 million) of all grant contributions: Germany (US\$260 million), the US (US\$216 million), EU institutions (US\$195 million), UK (US\$152 million) and Canada (US\$54 million). The largest loan amount was provided by the EIB, at US\$1.2 billion (40% of loans), while the second largest came from France, at US\$646 million (21%). The EBRD provided US\$598 million (19%) in loans, the World Bank US\$288

⁹⁰ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁹¹ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁹² Monitoring and Assessment Framework

million (9%). Germany, Japan and Italy accounted together for 11% (US\$345 million) of total loans to Jordan.⁹³

Examining the extent to which the international community is fulfilling its funding commitments is complicated by the fact that available sources provide conflicting information. MoPIC reporting shows that the JRP received US\$ 1,2 billion (50.5%) of the US\$ 2.4 billion it needed to finance the JRP for 2019 (see Table 1), suggesting that donor funding is falling well-below needs. JORISS reflects funding received for implementing partners under the Syria Response and some bilateral agreements, but it does not reflect any loans. The most recent Brussels-commissioned Development Initiatives (DI) financial tracking report⁹⁴, however, indicates that financial flows from participating donors in 2019 surpassed those in 2018 (including loans and grants). Improved financial tracking methods are required to reconcile these differing perspectives.

Financial tracking by GoJ

MoPIC financial reporting for JRP/JORISS indicates that the international community provided less grant funding in 2019 compared to previous years, both in terms of overall amount as well the extent to which it meets JRP funding requirements (See Table 1).

Table 1: Reported JRP Grant Funding 2016 to 2019 (USD, millions)⁹⁵

JRP data on Grants	2016	2017	2018	2019
Budget Support	385.0	306.8	507.1	393.5
Humanitarian (support for refugees)	600.6	653.7	716.7	500.6
Resilience (support to host communities)	646.7	758.4	362.8	317.0
Total Grants	1,632.3	1,718.9	1,586.7	1,211.0
JRP funding requirement	2,675.90	2,650.0	2,483.0	2,400.2
% Covered by grants	61.0%	64.9%	63.9%	50.5%

In previous years, the international community more than met its commitment to maintain overall levels of funding at 2016 levels, and supported both refugee and resilience programmes at levels above the average funding response to humanitarian appeals worldwide.⁹⁶ This helped to relieve the pressure on Jordan's resources, while not fully meeting its needs or aspirations. JRP figures for 2019 suggest that only Humanitarian support has been maintained at high levels (See Table 2), with less focus on the infrastructure and resilience

⁹³ Development Initiatives, April 2020.

⁹⁴ Seen in draft and awaiting publication.

⁹⁵ Monitoring and Assessment Framework

⁹⁶ The average Appeal response in 2018 was 61.5% (see data from OCHA, 2018, [link](#))

funding that is necessary to enable Jordan to maintain quality services for Syrian refugees and to mitigate the impact of Syria crisis on Jordan.

Table 2: MOPIC Reported Financial Contributions to JRP 2019 (USD, millions)

	2019 Funding Requirement	Funded	% 2019 Requirement Met
Budget Support	998	393.5	39.4%
Humanitarian (or Refugee Support)	713	500.6	70.2%
Resilience	689	317	46.0%
Total	2,400	1,211	50.5%

Source: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, *Funding Status for Jordan Response Plan 2019*, 13 February 2020

Brussels Conference Financial Tracking

Financial contributions are monitored through Post Brussels Conference Reports, produced by Development Initiatives (DI). Due to differences between the data that is collected by DI and JORISS, the DI figures and those reported by Government of Jordan relative to the Jordan Response Plan are unlikely to reconcile. Progress could be made, however, on better understanding the differences between different sets of data and clearer presentation of the definitions and methodologies on which they are based. Central to this would be an enhanced dialogue between GoJ and IC at both the strategic level and the working level to increase openness and mutual understanding of the different processes of data collection and reporting. This is important because at the moment there is no consensus even on overall trends and sectoral priorities and funding.

The latest March 2020 DI report found that donors had contributed US\$ 1,157 million in 2019, exceeding the US\$ 685 million that they had pledged by 69%. Moreover, the DI reports show that funding contributions in 2019 report were 22% higher than they were in 2018 (US\$ 1,157m in 2019, compared to US\$ 946m in 2018), suggesting that donors participating in the Brussels process provided significantly more funding in 2019 than in 2018 (see Table 3).

Table 3: Development Initiatives Brussels Conference financial tracking reports

Funding situation end 2019 ¹		Funding situation end 2018 ²	
(USD, millions)		(USD, millions)	
Grants	Loans	Grants	Loans

	2019	Upcoming (2020 & beyond)	2019 and beyond	2018	Upcoming (2019-20)	2018-20
% Met	168.9%	62.7%	293.1%	223%	95.5%	111.4%
Pledged	685	671	1,063	406	463	1,958
Contributions	1,157	421	3,116	946	442	2,182
Committed	102	15	1,357	30	206	1,354
Contracted	103	402	1,161	24	192	160
Disbursed	952	4.1	598	892	45	668

Source: Development Initiatives, *Supporting Syria and the Region: Post-Brussels conference financial tracking. Report Nine (27 April 2020)*¹ and *Report Seven (March 2019)*

Financial Systems

Financial tracking within Jordan needs to be improved. AFIS is a tracking tool for all contracted assistance linked to reported pledges by donors. Funding received through AFIS has been reviewed and data uploaded by GoJ for the period 2017-2019, but very few donors have uploaded their data. Under AFIS, the government enters 95% of all data on committed and contracted amounts, while donors only enter pledges. The system is designed according to OECD/DAC terminology, and the Government reports all contracted amounts. Each donor has their own working definition as to what constitutes a pledge and commitment. There are no agreed definitions for pledges, commitments and contracted amounts. This leads to ambiguity and large differences, in particular between pledges. The AFIS system has never, therefore, been fully operational or widely used.

The JORISS system depends on NGOs and other implementing agencies to input high quality project data. Incomplete or incorrect data can lead to delay. JORISS faces challenges of reporting, including the fact that NGOs and implementing agency staff are not familiar with the system due to a high turnover among staff. Reporting is at a different stage in the process, and can be in different financial years, from the reporting for the follow up of commitments made at the Brussels meetings. Changes in procedures and ability to train staff are also an issue in light of the recent update of the system. MoPIC periodically conducts JORISS training for groups and individuals on request. JORISS faces challenges of data input, including the annual reporting of UN data near the end of the year, and we believe Government figures for 2019 are likely to be revised upwards as the system gathers more complete information.

4.8 Partnership - Aid quality and effectiveness

Summary of commitments

- Provide additional resources that are preferably multi-year, inclusive of grants and

budget support

- **Funding should be aligned with Jordan's priorities**
- **Expand the use of national capacities to implement assistance, and purchase national goods and services Identify the best modality to assess progress against commitments**

New lending instruments have been developed to allow Jordan to access concessional funding from the World Bank and other international institutions, including the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCF) and a change in the World Bank rules to allow middle-income countries to receive large-scale concessional financing. Within the GCF, Jordan has benefited from 6 out of 11 projects currently underway, with GCF support of \$212 million exclusively for Jordan and \$228 million of joint Jordan/Lebanon projects out of a global total of \$584 million.⁹⁷ There has also been innovation in the development of Multi-Donor Accounts in education and health and in the EU's Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syria crisis. Cash-based assistance is a prominent and increasing modality for assistance.

There is scope for greater alignment to the Paris principles on aid effectiveness.⁹⁸ The JRP 2018-2020 stated that it "is a genuine commitment of the Government of Jordan to put into practice the aid effectiveness and coordination principles that were established in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness". The process around the Brussels III conference in 2019 included significant beneficiary consultations and engagement with a wide range of civil society organisations in the Brussels meetings themselves.

MoPIC is reducing the time for processing NGO projects, although approvals in line ministries remain highly variable. MoPIC introduced a new guideline for JORISS usage and a rule that requires line ministries to provide feedback within 8 working days concerning the project (approved or not approved). If no feedback is received within this period, then the project will automatically be considered as approved. MoPIC confirmed in March 2020 that the process of approval from uploading project action plans in JORISS takes 4-5 weeks, but a partial monitoring exercise by the JIF of 2019 data for 29 NGOs suggested an average time of 92 days for the full approval process. GoJ notes that the reasons for delays in the approval process include implementing agencies uploading incomplete or inaccurate information, text being translated using Google translate which causes confusion and implementing agencies being slow in responding to queries. MoPIC note that they have requested details of delayed projects and seek to expedite approvals with ministries and implementing partners.

A multi-partner task force has supported MoPIC in mapping and determining the linkages between existing plans and strategies in particular the Jordan National Renaissance Project,

⁹⁷ GCF Annual report 2019, [link](#)

⁹⁸ See OECD for more details, [link](#)

Human Resources Development Strategy, 5 year reform Matrix, Jordan Economic Growth Plan and Jordan Vision 2025. There is need for much clearer targets and impact indicators within monitoring frameworks.

Sector co-ordination survey

Donor co-ordination continues to vary in quality by sector and needs to cover policy and strategy coordination, as well as information sharing. Co-ordination is generally strong on the humanitarian side, but more variable for development partners. One of the indicators developed in our March 2019 report, under the sector of aid quality and effectiveness, was a process indicator of the regularity and quality of donor and other agencies' co-ordination by sector.⁹⁹ In order to assess this, Agulhas developed a questionnaire, which was sent in September 2019 and then again during the first quarter of 2020 to the Chairs of the Sectoral Co-ordination Groups for onward distribution to their members. The survey was anonymous. Good response rates were received from the protection (exclusively INGOs), education, health and livelihoods groups, with less good response rates from other groups. The figures below represent the 2020 results with comparisons to the data from September 2019.

Overall findings of the survey

1. 70% of respondents believe that coordination groups are representative and include all relevant partners, compare to 57% in the last round
2. 57% believe that the coordination groups were average in producing intended results, a decrease from last time (65%)
3. 39% believe that coordination bodies were poor or average in making their systems and procedures transparent

The quality of coordination varies between sectors:

- Education – one of the best performing sectors, with majority of 'good' and 'excellent' responses in terms of coordination in information sharing and alignment to government priorities. 60% of respondents regard coordination in producing intended results as average.
- Health – all respondents regard the coordination in sharing information to avoid duplication as good, and system transparency as good/average. 67% of respondents think the coordination between GoJ, donors, local and international implementers in harmonizing procedures is average or poor.
- Livelihoods – All respondents think that there is average/good representation in the coordination body. 67% of respondents believe that there is average level of alignment with GoJ priorities. 50% of respondents think there is poor coordination among all actors when dealing with difficult issues.

⁹⁹ Coordination groups are different in each sector, while some only include donors; others include donors, GoJ and NGOs. The frequency with which they meet is also highly variable.

- Protection – All respondents think that there is average or good level of coherence and mutual support for work implementation in the sector. 50% of the respondents believe there is excellent transparency in systems, procedures and results sharing.
- Social protection – All respondents think there is good coordination among actors when dealing with difficult issues, but it is average when it comes to the extent to which opportunities for discussion (consultations) are provided and when it comes to producing intended results.

There are limited opportunities for Jordanian NGOs to engage in policy dialogue with international actors. The Jordanian National NGOs Forum (JONAF) is the leading local forum for NGOs. JIF is moving to include JONAF and other local NGOs in its consultation processes in the lead up to the Brussels IV meeting, as it did for the Brussels III meeting in 2019.

5. Way forward

The impact of COVID-19

COVID-19 will have significant economic and social impacts in Jordan. The lockdown measures introduced in Jordan, the disruption of regional and global markets and the deteriorating global economic outlook will have a significant impact on the Jordanian economy, adding to an already challenging macroeconomic situation, characterized by large fiscal and external imbalances.¹⁰⁰ Every sector will be affected. The health sector will be put under immense pressure. The education sector will suffer from the closure of schools and the challenges of moving to remote schooling in the absence of universal Internet or television access. The social protection sector will see more families moving into extreme poverty and requiring cash transfers to survive.

COVID-19 hit Jordan in the first half of March 2020. GoJ has taken decisive actions to contain and mitigate the effects of COVID-19. Schools were closed from 15 March. GoJ imposed a nationwide 24-hour curfew between 21 and 24 March and then allowed residents to purchase necessary items at local supermarkets and pharmacies between 10 am and 6 pm. Further 24-hour curfews were announced during April. During the curfew, GoJ addressed the medical needs of people by delivering medicines to people's houses or transporting them to health

100 For details of the GoJ response, see World Bank, "Jordan COVID-19 Emergency Response" (April 2020), [link](#)

facilities. The Ministry of Health (MOH) has been leading public health efforts to contain the spread of infections and mitigate the impact on the healthcare system.¹⁰¹

GoJ has made it clear that the protocols for addressing COVID-19 will be the same for all people living in Jordan (Jordanian citizens as well as foreign workers and refugees including Syrians), reflecting the nature of the pandemic as a public health emergency. International organisations and donors are restructuring their programmes to respond to the crisis.

Brussels III meeting pledges in March 2019 suggested that donors intend to sustain their financial support to Jordan in 2020 and beyond, with a gradual shift from humanitarian to development funding.¹⁰² As well as the huge challenges of the pandemic, the current crisis also creates opportunities. It has raised again the questions of transition and nexus that will allow a sustainable long-term response to the needs of all people living in Jordan regardless of their origins or nationality. Work is already underway to move towards more integrated vulnerability assessments, and there is need to move to a more comprehensive and holistic planning framework and sectoral targets.

Future monitoring and recommendations

The independent monitoring process continues to reveal gaps and inconsistencies in the data, even for basic indicators. In addition, there are still very limited forward-looking targets for the JRP and national plans that can be used to monitor the Jordan Compact and Brussels Partnership commitments. There is a need to decide what monitoring will be in place for the future and how to integrate this process into the monitoring of national and sectoral plans.

The recommendations of this report fall under five main areas covering actions to improve the monitoring and assessment process and to move to more comprehensive and integrated approach for implementing existing commitments. They are recommendations by the Independent Assessor and do not represent commitments from either the GoJ or the IC:

1. **Undertake focused research, regular large scale surveys building on the Fafo work, systematic data gathering and comprehensive beneficiary feedback from all affected populations** to ensure adequate information is available on which to base decisions.
2. **Create a consolidated database for vulnerability assessments.** The new commitment from GoJ and IC to common vulnerability assessments provides an opportunity to rationalise and harmonise data in this area as a foundation for interventions to help those in greatest need, both Jordanians and refugees, across the full range of sectors.

101 For details of the GoJ response, see World Bank, "Jordan COVID-19 Emergency Response" (April 2020), [link](#)

102 Presentation of an anonymous donor survey to the Humanitarian Partners Forum, Amman, February 2019

From 2021 onwards, targeting for assistance will be further informed by the results of a joint comprehensive vulnerability assessment (JCVA). The JCVA should follow a participatory approach (involving all agencies concerned, NGOs and beneficiaries) and should serve as the joint analysis for defining the collective outcomes.

3. **Ensure sustainable long term funding** from the IC, including increasing multi-year commitments aligned to GoJ's long-term development priorities, while recognising the continuing presence and needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan.
4. **Work within a comprehensive framework of national strategies and plans** bringing together GoJ and donor programmes for all communities across the main sectors to include clear targets, impact indicators and evaluation plans to assess progress and results and identify gaps in implementation, with a greater emphasis on gender, youth and disability issues.
5. **Strengthen co-ordination** to include GoJ, the UN, other multilaterals, bilateral donors and both international and national civil society organisations to work within shared frameworks covering all communities based on needs and vulnerability.



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